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1. INTRODUCTION 
Leon Roches came to Japan in 1864 as French Minister, 
and during his tenure of office he cultivated a relationship 
of special intimacy with the Bakufu. He displayed consider-
able activity in various fields, diplomatic, military, economic, 
etc., in an attempt to secure an advantage\lus position for 
his country in rivalry with Sir Harry Parkes, the British 
Minister. His fundamental policy was to support the Bakufu, 
and he made many recommendations to the Bakufu regard· 
ing the reform of its administration. Even after the Bakufu's 
surrender of power to the Emperor, he continued to support 
it, so much so that he actually advised the Tokugawas to 
try to recapture power. He met with reverses, however, 
and left for home in April, 1868, with his cherished desire 
unfulfilled. 
2. FRANCE'S SUPPORT OF THE BAKUFU 
It is a well·known fact that in the closing years of the 
Bakufu, the Satsuma and the ChOshii clans befriended Britain, 
while the Bakufu was on specially intimate terms with 
France. Below, I shall give an outline of the relations then 
existing between the Bakufu and France. 
(a) The campaign against Satsuma and ChOshii. It 
appears that Napoleon the Third had the ambitious design 
of extending French influence to the Far East and instructed 
Leon Roches to help the Bakufu with this object in view. 
When, in 1864, Ikeda·Chikugo·no· Kami ill! m~i&,* and his 
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party visited Paris, Comte de Mont Blanc suggested to the 
Japanese Envoy that, if Japan's prosperity was to be attained, 
the influence of the various daimyo (feudal lords) should be 
curtailed. He added that as this object could not possibly be 
achieved by the Bakufu, single·handed, France's armed help 
should be sought. The French Government also gave Chikugo· 
no·Kami to understand that if the Bakufu desired to repress 
the rebels at home and maintain permanent friendship with 
outside countries, France would be willing to help it. This 
attitude of the French Government accounts for the inclusion 
of a provision for French armed assistance in a treaty of four 
articles, concluded by Chikugo·no·Kami with the French 
Foreign Minister in Paris in Mal' of the same year. As 
this treaty was not ratified by the Bakufu on the ground 
that the Japanese Envoy acted ultra vires in the matter, it 
is popularly called the unratified treaty of Paris. 
It is also said that when Itakura·Iga·no-Kami 1N::i!l"1J:lI!l',i' 
interviewed Roches at Hyogo, the French Minister urged on 
him the necessity of bringing the campaign against Choshii 
to a speedy end, saying that delay might increase the chances 
of Britain's instigation, on the one hand, and of the growth 
of hostility to the Bakufu on the part of many daimyo, on the 
other. He further told him that France would be ready to 
supply the Bakufu with as many guns as it desired to have 
and put her warships at the service of the Bakufu, though 
the sale of warships in the circumstances then prevailing 
would be impossible under the treaties by which Western 
countries were bound. He nevertheless indicated the readi-
ness of his country to convert merchantmen into warships 
and supply them to the Bakufu. From this episode it is 
clear that France was prepared to supply arms to the Bakufu 
in order to enable it to achieve the object of its campaign 
against ChOshii. 
The policy of enhancing the authority of the Bakufu by 
calling in the aid of France to repress Satsuma and Choshii 
found supporters among the officials of the Bakufu also. 
Among its supporters may be mentioned Abe-Bungo-no-Kami 
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"JliIlfUl!!;'f, Matsumae-Idzu-no-Kami *iillffrR!;'f, both of the roju 
~q., Sakai-Hida-no-Kami i!li"HI~!lIil!;'f, a wakadoshiyori ;Ii"f-iJr, 
Oguri-Kodzuke-no-Suke 1j,:ml:!l!f1l-, a kanjo bugyo 1\IJ):i!>I'fl', and 
Takemoto-Haito-no-Sho 1t*1I!AiE, a osoba goyo toriisugi 1l1J1l!! 
1l1J)jjJlj(*_ These officials thought it a wise policy to subdue 
Satsuma and ChOshu with the help of France, and then, to 
follow up the advantages of victory, to curtail the powers 
and domains of the daimyo, introducing a new system of 
local administration_ In this way, they hoped to unify the 
whole country permanently and effectually under the rule of 
the Tokugawas_ After the retirement of Abe and Matsumae 
from office, Oguri-Kodzuke-no-Suke stood out conspicuously 
among the advocates of this policy_ 
(b) Military training_ In 1862, the Bakufu organised 
infantry, cavalry and artillery on the Western model, but in 
view of the very tardy progress made in the training of these 
troops during the next four or five years, Asano-Mimasaka-
no-Kami i'J!:!I!f~1'i'!;'f and Oguri-KOdzuke-no-Suke approached 
the French Minister, through Kurimoto-Sebei :m*ifil*lti, a 
meisuke i'l#, about March, 1865, with a request for the recom-
mendation of military instructors_ The French Government 
acceded to this request, and on the last day of September 
of the following year, a contract for the engagement of 
Colonel Chanoine and a few other instructors was signed, 
Flury Herald, the Japanese honorary Consul in France, 
signing the contract on behalf of the Bakufu_ Subsequently, 
the Bakufu established a military training school at Yoko-
hama with these French officers as military instructors_ In 
June, 1867, this institution was moved to Edo (Tokyo), a 
military academy being established in the Rikugunsho (ArmY 
Institute), with parade grounds at Etchujima and Komabano_ 
These military instructors were discharged in February, 
1868, however, only two years after the military training 
was initiated under their instruction_ 
With regard to the navY, the Bakufu opened a naval 
training school at Nagasaki in 1855, but closed it in February, 
1859_ A French naval officer was later engaged. and instruc-
----------
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tion in naval arts was started from January 4th, 1866, on 
board the warship FujiYama which was moored in the port 
of Yokohama. On the advice of Roches, who suggested that 
naval training should be entrusted to Britain on the ground 
that it was not proper, from the point of view of inter· 
national courtesy, that France should undertake both military 
and naval training, the Bakufu suspended the naval training 
on board the Fujiyama in April of the same year, and in 
July or August, the matter of naval training was left in the 
hands of the British Minister. 
(c) The supply of arms. In a letter addressed to the 
roju of the Bakufu undt'I date of September 19th, 1865, 
Roches stated his views on the campaign against ChOshU 
and also pressed the Bakufu for the opening of ports to 
foreign intercourse. In this letter, he says: "If the Imperial 
Court withholds consent to the conclusion of treaties, the 
misgivings of foreign countries will naturally remain, which 
will render international friendship impossible. In such an 
event, Japan would be unable to obtain from foreign countries 
newly invented arms, nor could she hope to get valuable 
books on strategy or learn marvellous arts of warfare from 
others. Then, she would be unable to strengthen her army 
and navy." Yoshinobu !!If:, the Shogun, in his letter to 
Roches dated August 2nd, 1866, asked for his good offices in 
the purchase of guns and warships. In this letter, the Shogun 
mentioned that the campaign against Ch6shU had not been 
concluded, though it had already been going on for a year, 
and stated his view that it would be impossible to subdue 
the clan quickly by means of the naval force only. He then 
asked him to see that guns, ritles and transport steamers 
were quickly supplied so that the Bakufu's victory might 
be assured. In another letter, dated the 27th of the same 
month, the Shogun thanks Roches for his ready consent to 
the above·mentioned request and for his prompt communica-
tion of this request to his home Government, soliciting the 
French Minister's redoubled efforts to enable the Bakufu to 
obtain warships, naval machines and guns and ritles, which, 
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the Shogun says, are no less important than the training of 
cavalry, artillery and infantry for making the country rich 
and strong. As already mentioned, it was the plan of Oguri· 
K6dzuke-no·Suke and his fellow·thinkers in the Bakufu to 
purchase arms from France and secure her financial help, 
and to unify the whole country and firmly establish the 
system of the centralisation of power by subduing Ch6shii as 
soon as these arms were obtained. In the" Life of Lord Nabe· 
shima·Naomasa M§I,i![lE~W" appears the passage: "The 
Bakufu secretly endeavoured to purchase warships and arms 
valued at $ 7,000,000 from France, through the intermediary 
of Roches, the French Minister, with a view to subduing 
Ch6shii with these weapons." It is thus clear that the 
Bakufu attempted to obtain the supply of arms from France. 
(d) The support of the Bakufu. It is said that when 
Roches was received in audience by Yoshinobu at Osaka 
Castle on February 6th, 1867, he urged the Shogun to fulfil 
treaty obligations. He pointed out that the failure of the 
Bakufu to discharge treaty obligations was due either to its 
aversion to diplomatic intercourse or to its lack of power to 
carry out its policy. In the former case, the foreign Govern· 
ments might resort to armed force, while in the latter case 
they might be driven to make common cause with influential 
clans against the Bakufu. The Satsuma and the ChOshii 
clans were already plotting to rise in open revolt against the 
Bakufu, acting in collusion with Britain. It was, therefore, 
advisable, he said, for the Bakufu to decide definitely to 
open the port of Hy6go and another port as a substitute for 
Niigata, and also to open the ports of Shimonoseki and 
Kagoshima in lieu of Edo and Osaka, the opening of which 
should be given up because of the unfavourable popular 
feelings prevailing in those cities. If the Bakufu shaped its 
course in this way, the rumour circulated by Satsuma and 
ChOshii that the Bakufu was against diplomatic intercourse 
would die a natural death. Again, if the Satsuma and the 
Ch6shil clans refused to open the ports in their respective 
domains, it would prove their crafty designs. The course 
40 E. HONIO 
suggested, the French Minister declared, would serve to 
demonstrate the sincerity of the Bakufu, on the one hand, 
and defeat the plots of the two influential clans, on the other. 
His advice was not acted upon, but it shows how Roches 
regarded the relations between Britain and the two clans 
and what course he desired the Bakufu to pursue. 
Roches further laid before the Shogun his views on both 
domestic and foreign administration, disclosing what he be· 
Iieved to be the best plan for restraining Sir Harry Parkes, 
tbe British Minister, and dilating on the course which the 
Bakafu should shape in dealing with the Imperial Court. 
He is said to have accused Britain of contriving to harass 
the Bakufu by making common cause with many daimyo, 
while representing France, America and Holland as friendly 
to the Bakufu. 
In April, 1867, Roches, apprehensive of the behaviour 
of Satsuma, Chashii and Britain, memorialised the Bakufu, 
urging it to proclaim to all outside countries the Japanese 
form of government. 
On October 14th of the same year, Yoshinobu surrender· 
ed power to the Emperor, ahd in December, the diplomatic 
representatives of Britain, America, France, Holland, Italy 
and Russia addressed an inquiry to the rajit, asking which 
Government would handle diplomatic matters after the change 
that had just been effected in the Japanese form of Govern· 
ment. At that time, Roches secretly advised the rajit to take 
the opportunity afforded by this joint inquiry to make the 
foreign countries recognise the right of the Tokugawa family 
to handle foreign matters as theretofore, saying that the 
course was opportune as it was impossible to predict the 
future turn of events in Japan. 
It is said that when, after his defeat in the battle of 
Toba and Fushimi, Yoshinobu returned to Edo on January 
12th, 1868, Roches saw him and strongly urged him to rally 
his forces in order to restore power, assuring him that in 
that event France would be willing to supply all the war, 
ships, arms and war funds that he might require. The 
LEON ROCHES AND BAAVFU'S ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 41 
Shogun, however, rejected his advice on the ground that 
the suggested course was impossible in the light of Japan's 
national polity. 
From the facts enumerated above, it is clear that Roches 
was emphatic in his support of the Bakufu. 
3. ROCHES'S VIEWS ON THE REFORM OF THE 
BAKUFU'S ADMINISTRATION 
(a) Roches's views on the reform of administration. It 
is said that during his stay at Atami one winter, Roches 
invited to his hotel Hirayama·Tosho·no·Kami·Takatada 'l'UJ~ 
il'IDlllt.:!:. and Kawakatsu·Omi·no·Kami·Hiromichi JlIIlil1i:iIW1IIiili 
-officials in charge of foreign affairs-and advised them to 
effect the administrative reform of the Bakufu, handing them, 
at the same time, a written memorial to the Bakufu with a 
request that they lay it before the Shogun. In this memorial, 
he advised the Bakufu to fulfil treaty obligations and take 
vigorous steps to increase national resources and strength. 
To this end, he suggested among other things, the opening 
of the port of Hyogo, the reorganisation of the Cabinet and 
the improvement of the army and the navy. 
On February 6th and 7th, 1867, Yoshinobu received 
Roches at Osaka Castle to hear his views on administrative 
matters of importance. On the 8th of the same month, the 
Shogun sent Itakura·lga·no-Kami and Matsudaira·Nuido-no-
Kami 11:'l'1it1!l!lli1 to his hotel to seek his opinion on certain 
matters. It was on this occasion that the French Minister 
described the relations between Britain and the two clans of 
Satsuma and Choshii, and suggested to the Bakufu the advisa· 
bility of proclaiming its political position to the outside world. 
He further set forth his views on the need of curtailing the 
powers of the various clans so as to establish the system 
of the centralisation of power, of expanding the army and 
the navy, of reorganising the Government, and of supplant· 
ing the system of paying stipends in rice by that of paying 
in money. His idea was that the stipends then allowed should 
--.------- ---
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be halved and the other half devoted to the expense of 
reform. He also suggested that the daimyo should be exempted 
from their military duties, and be ordered to make monetary 
contributions instead. A commercial tax should be levied on 
merchants, and a land tax on the estates of temples and 
shrines. Companies should be established as organs for trad· 
ing, and mines be exploited for the development of industry. 
On the subject of the centralisation of power, Roches 
seems to have proposed the revival of the sankin kolai ~iI!x 
it system (under which daimyo attended on the Shogun by 
turns) with a view to curtailing the powers of the daimyo, 
and suggested the unification of the military and diplomatic 
powers in the Central Government. At the same time, he 
pointed out the advisability of allowing the daimyo participa' 
tion in the State administration, which, he suggested, should 
be conducted in consonance with the popular wishes. 
His plan for administrative reform was to divide the 
Government into six Bureaus-the Navy, the Army, Foreign 
Affairs, Finance, Home Affairs and Justice. Each Bureau, 
he recommended, should have one roja and one wakadoshi· 
yOri, the post of wakadoshiyori to be thrown open to talent, 
irrespective of family status. 
With regard to the revision of the method of paying 
stipends (feuds) and the imposition on the daimyo of the 
obligation to make monetary contributions, Roches set forth 
his views as follows. One noteworthy point in his proposals 
is his advocacy of the conversion of samurai into farmers 
and merchants. 
1. Assuming one koku of rice to be worth 10 ryo 
8,000,000 koku of rice will be equivalent to 80,000,000 ryo. 
In fixing new grants in money to retainers, the sums should 
be worked out at the rate of five ryo per koku of rice. As 
the Government is actually in financial straits on account of 
the heavy expenditure involved in its national development 
schemes, this reduction will not cause resentment among its 
retainers. If this method is adopted, 40,000,000 ryo will 
suffice for the new stipends, and the other 40,000,000 ryo 
----~- ------
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can be employed for financing various enterprises, including 
that of developing the army and the navy. 
2. The daimyo in hereditary vassalage should be ex· 
empted from the duty of maintaining their own troops, in 
readiness for the military needs of the Bakufu, and monetary 
contributions should be collected from them instead. The 
money thus collected should be used for paying the expense 
of the army and the navy, the maintenance of which should 
be a charge on the Bakufu. By this means the daimyo can 
be relieved of their financial difficulties, while the position 
of the Bakufu can be strengthened. They should be ordered 
to hand over to the Bakufu all able·bodied men in their 
troops, and to convert the rest into farmers and merchants. 
3. The number of the retainers of the Bakufu should 
be reduced. While retaining the services of men of ability, 
the others should be induced to follow commercial and 
agricultural pursuits. 
As regards the commercial and land taxes, he recom· 
mended:-
1. Merchants should be divided into four classes, and 
be ordered to pay two per cent. of their profits as a tax. 
2. Temples should also be made to pay two per cent. 
of their incomes as a land tax. 
3. It is a rule accepted all over the world that taxes 
should be light where the things on which they are imposed 
are necessaries, and heavy where they are luxuries. 
With regard to the establishment of companies, industrial 
development and the improvement of communications, the 
following suggestions were made:-
1. As the development of trade will help to improve 
the finances of the Bakufu, which will thus be enabled to 
meet heavy national expenditure, it is urgent that companies 
should be established as organs for trading. 
2. Various article are being imported from Europe, but 
it is to her interest that Japan should learn to produce all 
necessary things at home. For this purpose, manufacturing 
machines must be imported. Japan is rich in gold, silver, 
-.-.-.---~ -- - -- ---- - -----
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copper, iron and other resources, but as antiquated methods 
are being employed for mining, their production is limited. 
It is, therefore, advisable for the Bakufu to engage foreign 
mining engineers and workers for the full exploitation of 
mineral resources. It is also necessary to secure the services 
of foreigners who are skilled in the manufacture of woollen 
cloth and in breeding sheep. 
3. Japan has also a plentiful supply of hides, but as 
people are ignorant of the proper methods of tannirs, they 
are obliged to import costly hides from Western countries. 
As hides are necessary for the manufacture of implements 
of war, it is well for the Bakufu to engage foreigners to 
teach the art of tannirs. 
4. For the purpose of enriching the country, it is of 
prime importance to increase transport facilities and make 
good roads. If such facilities are provided at the cost of 
100 ryo, for instance, the profit accruing from them the next 
year will be 200 ryo at least. 
In another written memorial to the Bakufu, dated August 
28th, 1867, Roches set forth his views on the need of es-
tablishing a Finance, an Army, and other Bureaus. In his 
proposal for the creation of a Finance Bureau, he made the 
following recommendations:-
As the creation of an army and a navy entails enormous 
expenditure, there must be a large revenue to meet this ex-
pense. To this end, the following taxes and tolls must be 
collected :-
1. As the land tax, one-tenth of the total annual ex' 
penditure should be collected from houses and shops. The 
land tax is levied in all European countries where the 
budgetary system is adopted. 
2. Merchants should be divided into six grades, ac· 
cording to the amount of the profits they realise and also 
according to the kinds of their trades. When granting them 
licenses for their respective trades, they should be taxed. 
3. A tax should be levied on sake. 
4. A tax should be levied on tobacco. 
--.-.--
.----_ .. _---- ---
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5. Tea and raw silk should be taxed at sources of 
production. 
6. A toll should be imposed on Japanese vessels of all 
kinds. 
If it is impossible to arrange for the speedy execution 
of these tax plans, some devices must be elaborated where· 
by the money necessary for meeting emergency expenditure 
many be raised. Since the hatamoto (direct feudatories of 
the Shogun) are all loyal to the Shogun and are solicitous 
of his welfare and enhanced authority, it seems only proper 
to require them to make contributions towards the expenses 
of the Government. They should be ordered to donate one· 
tenth of their annual income to the national coffer. As this 
is an emergency measure, the period of its operation should 
be fixed at three years only. 
(bl Enforcement of the reform of the Bakufu's admini· 
stration. The administration of the Bakufu was actually 
reformed towards the end of ] 866 and in the following year. 
Many of these reforms were inspired by the recommenda· 
tions of Roches. 
In the first place, the raju were appointed to preside 
over the five Bureaus newly created. Roches recommended 
the creation of six Bureaus, but the number of the Bureaus 
actually created was five. The Bureau of Justice, though 
recommended by him, was not created. The proper func· 
tions of the raju consisted in helping the Shogun in the 
conduct of the State administration. Of these raju, none but 
the katte gakari iI''f-ID, the gaikoku gakari 71-i1m and the 
kairikugun sasai ~.*,!,!il!1I; was trusted with any particular 
branch of administration. All administrative matters were 
decided by their counsels. The office of katie gakari had 
been in existence for many years, but that of gaikoku gakari 
was created in 1856, while that of kairikugun sasai was 
brought into existence in 1862, though this office was left 
vacant after October of 1865. In pursuit of his new policy 
of appointing raju to the different branches of administra-
tion, the Shogun first appointed Matsudaira-Nuido-no-Kami 
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rikugun sosai I1!I;liII:>IJ!lliit (President of the Army Bureau) and 
Inaba-Hyobu-Dayu fIllJil1*ll1l*JiiIj kaigun sosai Iliilill:>IJ!lliit (President 
of the Navy Bureau) on December 28th, 1866. In May, 1867, 
he appointed Inaba-Mino·no-Kami fIllJil1~iiI'-l' kokunai jimu 
sosai 19<!F'l'lIH:lf>lJ!lliit (President of the Home Affairs Bureau), 
Matsudaira-Suo-no-Kami m'JiJIllJ!;!;'-l' kaikei sosai 1tiiN.tIliit (Presi-
dent of the Finance Bureau), Ogasawara-Iki-no-Kami IH!:lii\fl 
IIIX'.f gaikoku jimu sosai 71-l9<!l!HJit.tlliit (President of the Foreign 
Affairs Bureau). The Cabinet of the Tokugawa Bakufu was 
thus reorganised on the Western model. 
Next, high offices were thrown open to men of talent. 
Under the previous system, the office of wakadoshiyori was 
open to such samurai only as held a fief of 10,000 koku of 
rice or more. This rule was departed from for the first time 
in February, 1867, when Nagai-Genba-no·Kami 7k:!t-.'L:liWi, an 
ometsuke, was appointed acting wakadoshiyori (being made a 
regular wakadoshiyori on December 15th). In April of the 
same year, Asano-Mimasaka·no-Kami, acting rikugun bugyo 
1"I111<l\<irr, and Hirayama-Tosho-no-Kami, a gaikoku bugyo 71-1iill 
l\<Orr were promoted to the status of wakadoshiyori. In the 
state of things then prevailing, these appointment were 
regarded as a bold stroke of policy. 
Concerning taxation, as early as 1865 a plan was con-
ceived to create a business tax and a tax on the Dojima 
Rice Exchange. This scheme did not materialise, however. 
In consideration of the advice tendered by Roches, to which 
reference has already been made, the Bakufu resumed in-
vestigations, as the result of which the imposition of a busi-
ness tax on merchants and a land tax on temples, shrines, 
etc., was seriously considered. This scheme again failed to 
materialise. The drafters of a reform plan urged among 
other things the necessity of developing industry, exploiting 
mines and improving means of transport and communications. 
It is obvious that these proposals received the consideration 
of the Bakufu authorities. The proposal to establish com-
panies was carried into execution in Osaka in June, 1867. 
The necessity of developing the export trade was also 
.----~--.--~ -.--~ ----~~-- ---
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emphasised at this time. and the Bakufu at one time con-
templated sending Tsukahara-Tajima-no-Kami. ~L'ii1!!.~;F who 
combined the offices of kanjo bugyo and gaikoku bugyo. to 
Shanghai to inspect trade conditions_ Roches regarded this 
plan with disfavour. as he was then striving to gain for a 
French merchant the monopoly of the orders of the Bakufu 
for all imported goods. and he caused it to be abandoned_ 
Navigation by foreign-style ships between Edo and Kobe was 
initiated at this time. and schemes for colon ising Ezo and 
Karafuto and reforming the I_egal and the currency systems 
also received attention_ The conversion of hatamoto into 
farmers and merchants was also in contemplation as the 
reform plan shows_ Altogether. the reform then attempted 
was of a fairly sweeping character_ 
These energetic attempts at reform caused much un-
easiness among those who were bent on the overthrow of 
the Bakufu_ Iwakura-Tomomi *:kAiiJ!. for instance, express-
ed the view that Yoshinobu, the Shogun, was evidently a 
man of decision and courage with no small aspirations, as 
could be gathered from his general behaviour_ He might 
prove a formidable enemy to deal with, he said_ Sakamoto-
Ryiima jji(*i!~.m also referred, in an alarmist strain, to the 
great energy displayed by the Shogun in the direction of 
reforming his administration_ Again, Kido-Koin *p;q:7t. said 
that a new face had been put on the Bakufu's administration, 
and he admitted that the new military and naval system 
adopted by the Bakufu contained points worthy of note_ The 
Shogun's courage and resourcefulness were by no means 
contemptible_ Should the Imperialists allow themselves to 
be forestalled by the Bakufu and let slip the opportunity of 
restoring power to the Emperor, the Tokugawa regime 
might regain the prestige and influence it enjoyed in the 
days of its first Shogun, Iyeyasu ",)]!t_ 
.- -- ... --- -_._ ..... ~- --- - _._--- ------_.- - ----
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4. THE BAKUFU'S FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH FRANCE 
(a) The Yokosuka Ironworks. In many enterprises of 
financial and economic importance launched in the eras of 
Genji and Keio (1864-1867), Roches played no mean part. 
As the most notable of such enterprises must be mentioned 
the establishment of the Yokosuka Ironworks. In 1857, the 
Bakufu started the work of establishing an Ironworks at 
Akunoura, Nagasaki, and the work was completed in 1862. 
But as it was on too small a scale, it was incapable of 
repair·work for warships and other ships. Vessels requiring 
repairs had thus to be sent to Shanghai. A new scheme 
was consequently drawn up to establish an iron·foundry 
somewhere near Edo. It chanced that a complete set of 
machinery for repairing steamships was presented by the 
Saga clan to the Bakufu. This machinery ,had been pur· 
chased by Nabeshima·Naomasa fi!J.'ii\ii!'iE, the daimyo of the 
Saga clan, from Holland for an ironworks which he planned 
to establish at Saga. His plan was subsequently abandoned, 
partly because it involved heavy expenditure and partly be· 
cause no person competent enough to supervise the work 
were available. Having obtained this machinerY, the Bakufu 
planned to establish a dockyard and an ironworks in Muji· 
nagaya Bay in Sagami province, and with this object in 
view appointed officials, and conducted a survey. This 
scheme had to be given up, however, because the Bakufu 
could not find experts skilled in such engineering work, and 
the machinery was left to rust. Just at this time, Kurimoto· 
Sebei achieved the repair work of the transport ShOkaku· 
maru J;n1lJ)JL with the assistance of officers, engineers and 
mechanics from a French warship, whose services were 
secured through the intermediary of Roches. Thereupon, 
Oguri·K6dzuke-no·Suke conceived the idea of finishing the 
irohworks at Mujinagaya with the help of Frenchmen. In 
the opinion of Roches and Admiral Jaures, whom he ap· 
proached through Kurimoto, the machinery which the Saga 
LEON ROCHES AND BAKUFU'S ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 49 
clan had presented to the Bakufu was so small and of such 
limited horse-power that it would be incapable of anything 
except repair-work of small dimensions_ But as the absolute 
need of a dockyard and an ironworks was fully recognised, 
it was decided to establish a new ironworks in Yokosuka 
Bay and a small shipbuilding yard at Yokohama, as comple-
mentary to the Yokosuka Ironworks, with that machinery 
installed_ 
Thus, a written contract bearing the joint signatures of 
Ono-Izumi-no-Kami I]-'l!UUJit'.'f, a roju, and Sakai-Hida-no-Kami, 
a wakadoshiyori, was handed to the French Minister on 
January 29th, 1865, for the construction of the Yokosuka 
Ironworks_ Under this scheme, one ironworks, two docks-
one big and the other small-and three shipyards were to 
be built, together with an arsenal, in four years at a total 
cost of $ 2,400,000_ 
The work on the Yokohama Shipbuilding Yard started 
about February, 1865, at Yoshida Shinden (somewhere near 
the present Yoshida-ehO) and was practically finished in 
August, though it was not until the following year that the 
installation of the plant and all accessories was completed_ 
The work of establishing the Yokosuka Ironworks began in 
March, 1866_ On April 25th of the previous year, Shibata-
Hyilga-no-Kami ~IE a [0]"1', a gaikoku bug yo, left Japan for 
England and France by order of the Bakufu to engage ex-
perts and mechanics and to make purchases of machines 
and other articles_ The original scheme was to leave the 
whole construction work in French hands, but on the advice 
of the French Minister, who advised the Bakufu to purchase 
some machines from England in order to avoid arousing her 
jealousy, the Bakufu decided to dispatch the Envoy to Eng-
land also_ A civil commotion broke out in Japan when the 
work was still going on, and the Bakufu had to suspend 
operations, the French experts being taken to Yokohama on 
March 6th, 1868, to protect them from personal danger_ 
Both ironworks were taken over in April of the same year 
by the Meiji Government, which supplanted the Bakufu, and 
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the Yokosuka Ironworks was completed. It was renamed 
the Yokosuka Shipbuilding Yard in April, 1871. 
(b) The establishment of companies. In the written 
memorial submitted by Roches to the Bakufu in February, 
1867, the need of establishing companies was emphasised. 
The Bakufu itself had not been blind to this need, for two 
years previously it had discussed the advisability of establish· 
ing them, following foreign examples, for the development 
of trade and for providing better monetary facilities. The 
execution of this scheme was, however, in no small measure 
due to the advice of Roches. A representation was made 
in April of the same year under the joint signatures of 
Tsukahara·Tajima·no·Kami, who was at once kanjo bugyo 
and gaikoku b"gyo, Oguri·K6dzuke·no·Suke, a kanjo bug yo, 
Hattori-Chikuzen·no-Kami M~ll1lZUiJ'iF, and Hoshino·Bungo·no· 
Kami £lI!J''l!l!a'iF, acting kanjo bugyo, urging the Bakufu to 
establish companies and to issue gold notes. Two months 
later these proposals were put into practice. They were 
designed for the provision of trade equipment in connection 
with the opening of the port of Hy6go and the opening of 
Osaka for foreign trade. However, as the Bakufu was unable 
to provide the necessary funds, amounting to 800,000 or 
900,000 ryo, it ordered Osaka millionaires to establish com· 
panies, granting them the right of issuing gold notes. It is 
hardly necessary to say that the Bakufu's underlying motives 
were to develop trade and obtain funds for the opening of 
ports. 
(cl Japan's participation in a World Exhibition in Paris. 
In 1867, a World Exhibition was held in Paris. In June, 1865, 
Roches invited Japan to take part and send her exhibits, and 
the Bakufu, which accepted this invitation, caused Shibata· 
Hyiiga·no·Kami, who was then staying in Paris on a mission 
connected with the establishment of ironworks, to make the 
necessary preparations for participation, on consultation with 
the French Government. In April, 1866, the Bakufu issued 
a decree encouraging the sending of exhibits and announcing 
the issue of permits for those who desired to go abroad for 
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the prosecution of studies or for commercial purposes. It is 
said that the daimyo of Satsuma and Hizen and several 
merchants applied to the Bakufu for permission to send ex· 
hibits. Acting on the advice of Roches that the Bakufu 
should take the opportunity afforded by the Exhibition to 
send to France a relative of the Shogun to cultivate friend· 
lier relations with that country, Yoshinobu sent Matsudaira· 
Mimbu·Dayu t1;'I'Jj';ll'Il1l:iI!iti (Tokugawa-Akitake tiiJllogm:), who 
was also instructed to inspect social conditions in Europe. 
(d) Loans. As already mentioned, the Bakufu built 
workshops at Yokohama and Yokosuka, but as it was then 
in serious financial straits and as its difficulties were further 
accentuated by the civil commotion of 1868, it was compelled 
to obtain a loan of $ 500,000 from the Societe Generale and 
the French Mail Steamship Company on the security of these 
two factories. This loan was later redeemed by the Meiji 
Government. 
Two other loans which were urged on the Bakufu by 
Roches did not materialise, as Yoshinobu withheld approval: 
-(1) About July, 1866, Roches interviewed Ogasawara·lki· 
no·Kami at Kokura on the matter of this unsuccessful loan, 
and afterwards he discussed the matter with the Edo authori· 
ties. As a result, the kanjo bugyo was about to sign a loan 
contract with a French company on August 4th. (2) In a 
memorial presented by Roches to Yoshinobu on April 13th, 
1867, the French Minister suggested that a foreign loan 
should be raised from France and England for increasing 
Japanese· armaments, the region of Ezo being offered as 
security. 
5. CONCLUSION 
As the facts· described in the preceding chapters show, 
there subsisted close ties of friendship between the Bakufu 
and France. Roches supported the Bakufu so stoutly that 
he made various recommendations in regard to the reform 
of its administration, while, on the other hand, many Bakufu 
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authorities were prone to seek French help in many things, 
regarding France as more trustworthy than any other country. 
There was no doubt that Yoshinobu, the Shogun, trusted 
Roches, but he never intended to repress the anti-Bakufu 
elements with the armed and financial aid of France. He 
merely sought his advice as a help to his administration. 
This is clear from the fact that, in the spring of 1868, the 
Shogun rejected the earnest advice of Roches that he try to 
regain his power, and in the further fact that he refused 
the French offer of a loan. The Shogun held Japan's rela-
tions with foreign countries of greater moment than the 
Bakufu's relations with Satsuma and Ch6shu. 
In contrast with the Bakufu's close relations with France, 
the Satsuma and Ch6shu clans were in close relationship with 
Britain. According to Roches, the Satsuma clan secured 
from Britian a promise of valuable help in connection with 
its revolt against the Bakufu. The author of 'The Life of 
Sir Harry Parkes' says, on the other hand: "The French 
Minister, Mr. Leon Roches, was full of the peculiar French 
patriotism, so undisguisedly selfish, that has not seldom been 
a mark of French diplomacy in the East. He appears to 
have aimed at the creation of a sort of French protectorate 
of the Shogunate." Judging from the Eastern policy of 
France at the time and also from the general behaviour of 
Roches, it seems impossible to dismiss the above comment 
as entirely misdirected. But when it is remembered that he 
left the matter of naval training to Britain, chose to give 
Britain a share in the sales to the Bakufu of machinery for 
the Yokosuka Ironworks, and advised the Bakufu to raise 
foreign loans both in France and in England, it seems that 
Roches could not entirely ignore Britain. 
If, in those critical days, Satsuma had been misled into 
calling in the aid of Britain in achieving the work of Restora-
tion and the Bakufu had sought the help of France in 
curtailing the powers of the daimyo, such ill-advised courses 
might have culminated not only in serious social confusion 
but in the interference of Britain and France in the domestic 
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affairs of Japan. It was for fear of such a contingency 
arising that Yoshinobu acted as he did. His sincerity of 
purpose deserves praise. 
Setting apart his underlying motives, Roches often laid 
his constructive views before the Bakufu and helped it in 
various ways. The result was that big reforms were effected 
in military, political and economic matters, and a new face 
was put on the Bakufu's administration. Many economic 
measures adopted in the closing years of the Bakufu were 
traceable to his initiative or recommendation. In short, the 
role played by the French Minister in the formulation of 
the measures by which the Bakufu coped with the critical 
situation of the time was by no means negligible. At the 
same time, it is noteworthy that Oguri·K6dzuke-no·Suke, one 
of the leading figures in the Bakufu, was in close touch 
with Roches. 
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